St. Thomas and Bishop Tempier

Was St. Thomas Aquinas ever accused of being a heretic?
https://www.quora.com/Was-St-Thomas-Aquinas-ever-accused-of-being-a-heretic

Two answers, plus comments from me:

A I

Mark White

Psychotherapist

13.XII.2021

I don’t think they would have canonized him if they did.

Hans-Georg Lundahl

14.XII.2021

There was a second document from Paris, 48 years later, just before canonisation, when a successor of Tempier went out of his way to clear him of suspicions. Namely the ones voiced in the original 1277 document.

A II

Catholic Apologetics

Francis Marsden

37 years a priest. Lived and studied six years in Rome.

Answered Sun

Some of his works* were condemned by the University of Paris, because he drew upon the philosophy of the pagan philosopher Aristotle.

In the Condemnations of 1277 Bishop Tempier rejected a list of 219 propositions drawn from the works of Aristotle, and some from Aquinas, who was accused by others of “trying to baptise Aristotle.”

Aquinas had died in 1274, and the condemnations of propositions drawn from his works was soon afterwards annulled. The Paris edict was directed against MA teachers at Paris who seemed too enamoured of Aristotelian and Averroist ideas in natural philosophy.

* Footnote

"Some of his works" is now emended to "Some sentences drawn from his works"./HGL

a

Hans-Georg Lundahl

14.XII.2021

Would you mind telling me which ones of the 219 propositions were supposed to be from St. Thomas Aquinas?

“the condemnations of propositions drawn from his works was soon afterwards annulled.”

48 years later, Stephen III (Tempier was Stephen II) issued a document, just prior to the canonisation of St. Thomas Aquinas, clearing him.

Would you mind telling me exactly where you get it from this document annulled any condemnation touching any of the 219 theses because that condemnation was, on your view, one of a thesis that St. Thomas subscribed to?

Like, did you ever read the second document?

I have read and reread a list of the 219 theses, under the title “theses que Parisius et in Anglia contempnati sunt” and obviously on the understanding that Stephen III did not annul any of the theses, just clear St. Thomas of suspicions of having held these.

Joe Smith

18.XII.2021

I’m not familiar with the document of Stephen III but Aquinas definitely held some of the condemned propositions. Examples of some of the condemned prepositions that he held are listed below. You would have to know very nothing about Aquinas’ theories on the individuation of forms to disagree with that claim that he held 42 & 43. Maybe they were all confirmed by Stephen to have not been held by Aquinas in some certain sense according to which they needed to be understood in order to be condemned.

Here are some condemned propositions that he held:

42A.1 That God cannot multiply individuals of the same species without matter. 43A. That God could not make several intelligences of the same species because intelligences do not have matter. [...]

50A. That if there were any separated substance that did not move some body in this sensible world, it would not be included in the universe. [...]

52A. That the separated substances, in so far as they have a single appetite, do not change in their operation.

53A. That an intelligence or an angel or a separated soul is nowhere.

54A. That the separated substances are nowhere according to their substance. – This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that substance is not in a place. If, however, it is so understood as to mean that substance is the reason for being in a place, it is true that they are nowhere according to their substance.

55A. That the separated substances are somewhere by their operation, and that they cannot move from one extreme to another or to the middle except in so far as they can will to operate either in the middle or in the extremes. – This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that without operation a substance is not in a place and that it does not pass from one place to another.

115A. That God could not make several numerically different souls.

116A. That individuals of the same species differ solely by the position of matter, like Socrates and Plato, and that since the human form existing in each is numerically the same, it is not surprising that the same being numerically is in different places.

146A. That the fact that we understand less perfectly or more perfectly comes from the passive intellect, which he says is a sensitive power. – This statement is erroneous because it asserts that there is a single intellect in all men or that all souls are equal. 147A. That it is improper to maintain that some intellects are more noble than others because this diversity has to come from the intelligences, since it cannot come from the bodies; and thus noble and ignoble souls would necessarily belong to different species, like the intelligences. – This is erroneous, for thus the soul of Christ would not be more noble than that of Judas.

162A. That the science of contraries alone is the cause for which the rational soul is in potency to opposites, and that a power that is simply one is not in potency to opposites except accidentally and by reason of something else. 163A. That the will necessarily pursues what is firmly held by reason, and that it cannot abstain from that which reason dictates. This necessitation, however, is not compulsion but the nature of the will.

169A. That as long as passion and particular science are present in act, the will cannot go against them

Source*

https://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/PHS325/__Philosophy_in_the_Middle_Ages__The_Christian__Islamic__and_Jewish_Traditions.pdf

* Footnote

The source is an anthology of medieval texts either by philosophers, or in the case of the 1277 condemnations, at least relevant for philosophy.

In these, the numbering of "Mandonnet" is followed and he wrote Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIme siècle, volumes 1 à 2, in 1911.

I think it is safe to say, even if he was a dominican, that Pierre Mandonnet (who is also secondary literature in French and not in English) can stand some correction by for instance D. Piché or Louis Valcke writing 88 and 89 years later.

Hans-Georg Lundahl

18.XII.2021

First, you quote a document that spends 12 pages on the 1277 condemnations. It ends with John Buridan and that’s on 707 or 708.

My source for the condemnations is the full list by David Piché, in a book, from the appendix of which I took the version as condemned in England:

Département de philosophie (de Montréal, David Piché)

I also looked at an online resource:

https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ltp/2000-v56-n1-ltp2166/401278ar.pdf

And from my comment on my index for the English version, I noted from that link (hoping it still stands) :

Cependant, un retournement de perspective n'allait pas manquer de se produire. Redoutant cette dérive fidéiste qui s'était amorcée suite à l'intervention de Tempier, le pape Jean XXII allait réhabiliter la doctrine thomiste par la canonisation, en 1323, de Thomas d'Aquin, suivie, deux années plus tard, de la levée, par Etienne Bourret, de tout interdit que cette doctrine avait pu encourir de par la condamnation de 1277, comme il a été dit ci-dessus.

Whether or not John XXII actually was motivated by a mistrust of Tempier’s fideism or not, it gives his actions : he makes Stephen III Bourret lift any forbidding which St. Thomas’ doctrine could have incurred by the condemnation of 1277. THIS MEANS, he does not lift the condemnation of the propositions themselves.

Now, your examples.

42A.1 That God cannot multiply individuals of the same species without matter. 43A. That God could not make several intelligences of the same species because intelligences do not have matter. [...]

I defy you to actually find this verbatim in St. Thomas. What he says is, angels cannot be individually different from each other, other than by being of different species, because they do not have matter. He does not say “God cannot” or “God could not” and I just checked.

The substance of the angels absolutely considered (Prima Pars, Q. 50) (Article 4)

50A. That if there were any separated substance that did not move some body in this sensible world, it would not be included in the universe. [...]

While St. Thomas actually says that angels usually do move bodies, and their presence is one of activity, he does neither say that they would not exist without doing this, nor that they would suddenly cease to be in a specific place if ceasing to move bodies.

52A. That the separated substances, in so far as they have a single appetite, do not change in their operation.

I think Tempier and the guys you cited would have taken this from a “videtur quod” section. God certainly in St. Thomas does perform diverse operations on His creation, and angels certainly do diverse operations too, and this both in St. Thomas and in general in the sources of the faith.

53A. That an intelligence or an angel or a separated soul is nowhere.

Again, St. Thomas specifically denies this. He says that separated souls are in Heaven, in Hell, in Purgatory, and for infants dying without baptism, in Limbo.

54A. That the separated substances are nowhere according to their substance. – This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that substance is not in a place. If, however, it is so understood as to mean that substance is the reason for being in a place, it is true that they are nowhere according to their substance.

And St. Thomas’ thought specifically fulfils the “if however” when he discurses on this.

55A. That the separated substances are somewhere by their operation, and that they cannot move from one extreme to another or to the middle except in so far as they can will to operate either in the middle or in the extremes. – This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that without operation a substance is not in a place and that it does not pass from one place to another.

Obviously, a soul being punished is certainly in a place where he is being punished, and it would certainly have been transferred there from God’s tribunal, even without operating herself.

The 12 pages you cite seem very shallow on St. Thomas.

115A. That God could not make several numerically different souls.

St. Thomas clearly thinks God does make several numerically different souls, by occasion of them being created for several numerically different bodies that are individuated by diverse matter.

116A. That individuals of the same species differ solely by the position of matter, like Socrates and Plato, and that since the human form existing in each is numerically the same, it is not surprising that the same being numerically is in different places.

I do not recognise this one from either Tempier or St. Thomas, but St. Thomas would not agree the latter part, he would consider Socrates and Plato numerically different, but specifically the same. So, NOT the same being numerically.

In the numbering I have from Piché, the original 116 from Tempier 1277 and the VIII:15 in the English version reads: Quod anima est inseparabilis a corpore, et ad corruptionem harmonie corporalis corrumpitur anima. If we have different numberings, it is fairly clear that the condemnations were copied more than once and therefore remained in force for a long time or at least perceived as remaining in force for a long time.

146A. That the fact that we understand less perfectly or more perfectly comes from the passive intellect, which he says is a sensitive power. – This statement is erroneous because it asserts that there is a single intellect in all men or that all souls are equal.

I do not find the Latin for these words in skimming over chapter VIII, errors about the soul or intellect.

Capitulum VIII

The number 146 in my version is XVI:3, namely this:

Quod possibile uel impossibile simpliciter, id est, omnibus modis, est possibile uel impossibile secundum philosophiam.

Capitula XV - XVIII

My number 147 is in VI, errores de Deo:

Quod impossibile simpliciter non potest fieri a deo, uel ab egente alio. -Error si de impossibili secundum naturam agitur.

Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius Condempnatorum

Your 162 is my 173:

18 (173). Quod scientia contrariorum solum est causa quare anima rationalis potest in opposita ; et quod potentia simpliciter una non potest ad opposita, nisi per accidens et ratione alterius.

I don’t think St. Thomas would have said this, but do you have a clue?

The 163 is however identical.

15 (163). Quod uoluntas necessario prosequitur quod firmiter creditum est a ratione : et quod non potest abstinere ab eo quod ratio dictat. Hec autem necessitatio non est coactio, set natura uoluntatis

And this is obviously not what St. Thomas thought either. It is what Socrates and Epictetus thought. A pretended condemnation of Thomism turns out to be a condemnation of Stoicism, but St. Thomas was no Stoic.

169A. That as long as passion and particular science are present in act, the will cannot go against them

Is my IX:2 = 129, namely: 2 (129). Quod uoluntas, manente passione et scientia particulari in actu, non potest agere contra eam.

Capitulum IX

I don’t doubt that Tempier may have thought St. Thomas said this, but would you mind telling me where he actually did so?

Joe Smith

18.XII.2021

I misspoke to some degree, but unless you can identify the actual source of the statement condemned in #42, I have a hard time believing that it wasn’t originally supposed to condemn a position that Aquinas held.

Is your demand that the statements be found in Aquinas’ works verbatim? Are the condemnations supposed to be verbatim quotations from some particular text? In that case, regarding the two examples that I specifically pointed out as things I was confident that Aquinas believed, I do not believe that they were verbatim quotations or that they were things that he would have said.

In the Summa Theologia, 1st Part, q25, Article 3, he says,

Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

So no, because as he says there, “it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.,” I think that you are right that nobody is going to be able to find a verbatim quotation saying

42A.1 That God cannot multiply individuals of the same species without matter.

43A. That God could not make several intelligences of the same species because intelligences do not have matter.

But are you disputing that the claim that “Individuals of the same species can be multiplied without matter,” is a word that is possible with God, in the sense of “word” used in Aquinas’ statement that, “"No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing”?

Aquinas would have rejected the claim that “That God can multiply individuals of the same species without matter.” Do you dispute that?

In some of the condemned statements, there is a distinction made explaining the sense in which they are condemned. For example,

54A. That the separated substances are nowhere according to their substance. – This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that substance is not in a place. If, however, it is so understood as to mean that substance is the reason for being in a place, it is true that they are nowhere according to their substance.

I ask non-rhetorically, what position was being condemned it statement 42, that did not need a comparable distinction? Do you think that the proposition being condemned means something like “Individuals of the same species can be multiplied without matter, but God cannot do it?” Did somebody actually teach that?

I’m not going to go through every proposition that I listed above. Obviously, I just copied them all out of another work and pointed out what I thought were some particularly good examples. Maybe some of them aren’t directed at any position that Aquinas held.

Hans-Georg Lundahl

19.XII.2021

IV Lord's Day of Advent

"I have a hard time believing that it wasn’t originally supposed to condemn a position that Aquinas held."

There is more like St. Thomas an Bishop Tempier each stepping up to a line.

St. Thomas says that angels naturally cannot be individuated other than by difference of species. Bishop Tempier insists that God could, if so, have created the world in a different manner. Duns Scotus will later say that God did precisely that, God individuates by heceitas. This is arguably where Bishop Tempier is leaning, but he doesn't insist (here) on it as long as it is admitted that God could have done otherwise.

So, Bishop Tempier is clearly holding his eyes on what St. Thomas said, but he's not condemning it in and of itself, he's just adding "go no further".

"Is your demand that the statements be found in Aquinas’ works verbatim?"

For his works to be condemned, either verbatim or with logically stringent conclusion from verbatim statement.

Following your discussion after this, if St. Thomas had said that it was a contradiction in terms to have angels individuated other than by difference of species, that would on St. Thomas' view have implied that it did not fall under divine omnipotence. But if you look up Bishop Tempier, he condemns the idea ... 3 (146). Quod possibile uel impossibile simpliciter, id est, omnibus modis, est possibile uel impossibile secundum philosophiam.

In other words, St. Thomas has on this view a refuge in this clause, as having uttered an impossibility according to philosophy which however is not impossible for God.

"Aquinas would have rejected the claim that “That God can multiply individuals of the same species without matter.” Do you dispute that?"

Whether he would or would not have that, he did in fact not. And it is not the least sure he would have rejected Scotist heceitas if presented with it.

"Do you think that the proposition being condemned means something like “Individuals of the same species can be multiplied without matter, but God cannot do it?” Did somebody actually teach that?"

No, but it means "individuals of the same species cannot be multiplied without matter AND not even God can do it" and the latter, St. Thomas did not add. Perhaps he would if he had followed out his thought, and here is where Bishop Tempier put up a warning sign for those who would.

Now, a ban is to be taken only on the proposition actually given or strictly synonymous, unless a judge goes out of his way to apply it to a similar and related case he thinks logically leads to an already condemned position, and this judge doing that is not Bishop Tempier, because he did not.

"Maybe some of them aren’t directed at any position that Aquinas held."

I would say, individuation without matter is the most crucial where we can safely say St. Thomas and Bishop Tempier disagreed, but this does not mean the latter actually condemned the former. Btw, I happen to lean, like I presume Bishop Stephen II did, to Scotist heceitas.

Joe Smith

19.XII.2021

IV Lord's Day of Advent

Duns Scotus will later say that God did precisely that, God individuates by heceitas. This is arguably where Bishop Tempier is leaning, but he doesn't insist (here) on it as long as it is admitted that God could have done otherwise.

I do not believe that Aquinas thought that angels could have been individuated other than by species if God had created the world otherwise. I think that he considered it something that could not have been done. And I do not think that his position is logically compatible with Scotus’ position. But I’m not really ready to compose a post that presents a robust argument against someone who thinks that this is a misreading of Aquinas. I could have done so at one time but it’s been long enough since I revisited those texts that I’m not able to defend my position now without spending more time than I’m willing to on a Quora post.

If you really think that Aquinas and Tempier are both stepping up to the same line without actually crossing it, and that Scotus resolves this issue without advancing a position that is incompatible with Aquinas’ position, I’d ask whether you know of any secondary literature, published in English, that you would recommend on this topic?

Hans-Georg Lundahl

19.XII.2021

IV Lord's Day of Advent

In brief resumé : Scotus and the position of Aquinas are basically incompatible.

However, while Tempier leaned to what Scotus later did, he did not oblige St. Thomas (retrospectively) to join Scotus. And what St. Thomas thought does not change that his actual words were in themselves not condemned.

No, I don’t know secondary literature in English, since I suppose you don’t count me …

b

Hans-Georg Lundahl

14.XII.2021

“Some of his works were condemned by the University of Paris,”

Which works?

I have only read the 219 theses, and in the version “theses que Parisius et in Anglia contempnati sunt” the “errores de prima causa sive Deo” (which start the systematics) are chapter VI, meaning things like enumeration of authors were in chapters I to V of Tempier’s original or the derived English Catholic document.

Francis Marsden

14.XII.2021

Amended accordingly. I’m sure you will give us the details!

b i

Hans-Georg Lundahl

14.XII.2021

You amended to “Some sentences drawn from his works” and you have still not said which ones.

The question was insofar genuine as reading a list of 219 propositions does not qualify me to state where each is from.

But it is also in a way rhetorical. My familiarity with St. Thomas (I have some) doesn’t allow me to verify that any of them were directly drawn from positions held by St. Thomas. Individuation of angels, they didn’t see eye to eye, but there is no direct confrontation. St. Thomas speaks of what God did, namely individuate angels by different species. Bishop Tempier condemns that He could not have done otherwise. Something St. Thomas didn’t state.

So, if you have proof positive that lots of the sentences were from St. Thomas, I’d like to see it. I don’t think you have that.

b ij

Hans-Georg Lundahl

15.XII.2021

I was just checking chapter XI of the “English” (in Anglia) version, and no, the position that “newness of the world” cannot be known except by faith is not one of the condemned propositions.

Capitulum XI

Obviously St. Thomas and Bishop Tempier agreed that the faith tells us and this is in fact also true and perfectly compatible with reason, that the world had a beginning.

Here is an overview over all chapters:

Index in stephani tempier condempnationes

I don’t think you can trace much to St. Thomas, unless you search in the “uidetur quod” sections of the articles. In other words, what the saint argued against, the bishop condemned.

My best clue to why Bishop Tempier mentioned St. Thomas (brother Thomas from Aquino) prior to the enumeration of 219 errors is, he had no clue how the questio form worked. Apart from that, the main doctrinal culprits were Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia.

b iij

Hans-Georg Lundahl

16.XII.2021

I still see “and some from Aquinas” plus the idea that those not were mainly from Aristotle rather than Paris University Averroists …

You have neither followed up my suggestion to correct that, nor documented me as being wrong.

And I still see “the condemnations of propositions drawn from his works was soon afterwards annulled,” when the fact is that only his name was removed from the condemnation, while the 219 propositions remained condemned.

Why? Slow in fact checking my corrections, or not interested in taking anything except abject submission on the matter from me?

b iu

Hans-Georg Lundahl

17.XII.2021

W a i t … I begin to see what you might mean with “I’m sure you will give us the details” … referring to my past and present carreer as promoter of angelic movers.

Capitulum XII

English XII:1 and original from Paris 92 : Quod corpora celestia mouentur a principio intrinseco, quod est anima ; et quod mouentur per animam et per uirtutem appetitiuam, sicut animal. Sicut enim animal appetens mouetur, ita et celum.

English XII:6 and original from Paris 213 : Quod natura que est principium motus in corporibus celestibus est intelligentia mouens. -Error, si intelligatur de natura intrinseca, que est actus uel forma.

This very explicitly allows for the position of St. Thomas Aquinas, that an intelligence = angel is moving celestial bodies as extrinsic mover.

In other words, if you state the angel of the Sun moves the Sun as I move my own feet, you fall afoul of Bishop Tempier, but if you state he moves the Sun as I move a bike with my feet, you are safe.

This is why the 219 propositions could remain condemned even after St. Thomas was fully exonerated.

When some people have reason to make use of Church history (as you might if you want to assess whether my position on angelic movers is orthodox or heretic), it is kind of somewhat preferrable if they get the Church history correct.

EDIT : I look up my comments on the chapter and see St. Thomas was, for his own part, indifferent as to whether angels move stars one way or the other. But it seems I either misread or the text was changed.

c

Hans-Georg Lundahl

14.XII.2021

“and Averroist ideas in natural philosophy.”

St. Thomas was as eager to refute Averroism as Bishop Tempier to condemn their errors.

d

Joe Smith

18.XII.2021 Saying that they were condemned “because he drew upon the philosophy of the pagan philosopher Aristotle,” is overly reductive. Great theologians had been drawing from pagan philosophers since the early church. It’s not as though that alone would have been sufficient. And if it had, then a massive portion of his work would have been condemned, not just a few scattered statements.

Hans-Georg Lundahl

21.XII.2021

Not agreeing any were in fact condemned, but the gist of your comment is on the right side.

However, it’s not just that, but also, if any were condemned, they would be also very few among the 219 propositions.